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We  examine the Australian Government’s role in the market for residential aged care in 
Australia and consider its impact on the incentives of market participants. We find that, due 
to the structure of the funding arrangements, providers are likely to have an incentive to 
discriminate against high-care  residents, in favour  of low-care  residents. Since high-care 
residents, unlike low-care residents, face few viable alternatives, many are forced into public 
hospital beds as a result. This has placed pressure on the broader health system. In providing 
lessons from our analysis for reform, we stress the importance of fostering proper incentives 
in policy design and infer the implications for health reform more broadly. 
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1  Introduction 
 
It is well known that the Australian population is ageing. Based on current projections the 
proportion of Australians aged 70 years and older will increase by half in the next decade, and 
by mid-century one in five Australians will be aged 70 years or older (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2006). Similarly, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006) predicts that by mid-
century the proportion of Australians aged 80 years and older will more than double. This is 
due to three factors: firstly, the ageing of the baby boomers, secondly, a reduction in fertility 
rates, and thirdly, a sustained increase in life expectancy. Similar trends have been observed 
in nations all across the world. 
  While this will have important implications for health care generally, its effects will 
be most acutely felt in aged care. Given a rapid expansion of the group of individuals in need 
of care and a similarly rapid dwindling of the number of individuals able to either fund this 
care or directly provide it, it is inevitable that the aged care sector will come under increased 
pressure in the decades ahead. Given this, it is prudent to ensure that the existing system is up 
to the task. The concern is that it appears, at least anecdotally, that the system as it currently 
exists in Australia is not functioning optimally (Parliament of Australia, 2009). It follows that 
if the system is unable to adequately perform as it is, then it will have little chance managing 
the kind of significant, sustained pressure anticipated. Examining the current conditions of 
demand and supply as well as the existing regulatory arrangements is an important precursor 
to developing policies that address the problems at hand. 
  Elderly people face a variety of circumstances, necessitating a range of alternative 
methods of care. The care needs and preferences of some individuals are such that they can 
remain in their own homes. Such individuals may receive what is known in Australia as 
community (or in-home) care. The services and care provided to them—many of which are 
supported by the Australian Government—are limited. At some point it may become 
necessary for an individual to seek a greater and more continuous level of care. Residential 
aged care providers satisfy this demand, offering a range of services depending mostly on the 
needs of the resident. While some residents require only minimal monitoring and support, 
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others require considerable assistance. In Australia, residents are categorised as either low- or 
high-care, depending on their requirements.  
  The focus of this paper is the Australian market for residential aged care services. We 
begin with a description of the current arrangements. The Australian Government intervenes 
in a number of ways; the interventions are complex and are likely to interact with one another 
to influence market outcomes. We then describe the incentives embedded in these 
arrangements. We consider the incentives of providers, residents, and the Government in light 
of the current policy framework. Some of these incentives are likely to lead to unintended 
consequences that ought to be of interest to policymakers. We conclude the paper by laying 
out the lessons of our analysis for reform. While we offer recommendations for the reform of 
the aged care sector in Australia, we also infer implications for the broader health reform 
agenda. 
   
2  The Government’s Role 
 
The Australian Government is involved in all aspects of the provision of residential care for 
the elderly: it regulates entry into the sector; it limits the number of beds that it funds and the 
level of this funding; it regulates the standard of care provision, and health and safety (which 
are also regulated by state and local governments); and it provides grants to aged care homes. 
Many of the measures’ origins can be traced back decades, while some have arisen from more 
recent reforms. They are an attempt by the Government to overcome a range of perceived 
market failures, and to provide services on an equitable basis. We describe each of the 
Government’s roles in turn.
2 
  The Government restricts entry into the subsidised portion of the market firstly on the 
basis of care quality. Firms must be accredited in order to receive subsidies on behalf of 
residents, the criteria for which mostly relate to care quality.
3 This function is performed by 
an independent body (Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency, 2009). The Australian 
Department of Health and Ageing must also certify providers before they may receive 
subsidies. The standards of the provider’s equipment and buildings, the standard of care 
provision, and the provider’s past conduct are all considered. In Australia, state and local 
governments play a role in quality regulation through the enforcement of health and safety 
guidelines. 
  While the Government does not explicitly restrict the quantity of residential aged care 
places provided, it does limit the number of subsidised places. Each year, following 
community consultation, the Department determines the number of subsidised places to be 
provided in local areas. Once the total number of places is determined, providers are invited 
to apply for part of the allocation. This is a competitive process, with places allocated to 
providers on the basis of numerous criteria.
4 Successful providers are then free to provide 
places to the number of residents for whom they have been allocated a subsidy.  
The Government provides a range of subsidies, all of which are, for practical reasons, 
distributed to providers. The Government provides funding and subsidised loans to aged care 
providers for investments in capital works. Subsidies are also allocated to providers on behalf 
of the residents for whom they care. The eligibility of residents to receive a subsidy and the 
level of that subsidy depend on the level of care required by the resident and their financial 
situation. 
                                                            
2 The Commonwealth Government’s various roles are governed by the Aged Care Act 1997 and the various accompanying 
legislative instruments. Our overview is derived from the relevant legislation, except where we indicate otherwise. 
3 A number of factors are considered: the suitability of key personnel; the ability and experience of the provider in providing 
aged care services; the ability of the provider to meet relevant standards of care provision; the provider’s commitment to 
the rights of care recipients; and the provider’s financial management record and methods to ensure sound financial 
management. 
4 The following attributes are considered: the expertise and experience of management; the planning and location of the 
premises; the appropriateness of the level of care provided; past conduct; the measures to be implemented to protect 
residents’ rights; and the level of care to be provided to those with special needs.  
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The Aged Care Funding Instrument (ACFI) is used by the Department to determine 
the level of care required by residents and thus the maximum subsidy that they will receive.  
Residents are assessed according to numerous criteria (refer to Table 1). Scores for each of 
the characteristics within a domain are aggregated to form a total score for each domain. 
These scores place the resident in either a low, medium, or high category for each domain. 
This classification process is intended to determine, as accurately as possible, the care 
requirements (and thus care costs) applicable to each individual. A daily amount is paid to 
homes, depending on the classification level of the resident in each domain. The daily 
subsidies for the 2009-2010 financial year are summarised in Table 2. The subsidy is 
calculated using the following formula: 
Subsidy = min{(ADL + BEH + CHC), $150.54}. 
  Aside from depending on the level of care, the subsidy is means-tested (refer to 
Figure 1). The means test operates as follows (Department of Health and Ageing, 2009b). 
Take a resident currently receiving the maximum daily care subsidy of $150.54. The resident 
continues to receive the full subsidy, provided that her income is below $58.04 per day. For 
every dollar that her income exceeds $58.04 per day, the daily subsidy is reduced by $0.416. 
As her income increases, the subsidy continues to reduce at this rate, until her income reaches 
$207.10 per day, at which point the daily subsidy remains steady at $88.43, regardless of any 
further increases in income. This scenario will vary depending on the amount of the subsidy 
for which the resident is eligible. 
 
TABLE 1 





DAILY ACFI SUBSIDY RATES ($) (01/07/09 – 20/06/10) 
 
Level  ADL  BEH  CHC 
Nil  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Low  29.78  6.81  13.40 
Medium  64.86  14.11  38.17 
High  89.85  29.72  55.12 
 
Domain  Characteristics 












Complex Health Care (CHC)  Medication 




In addition to subsidising residents' care costs, the Government subsidises some 
residents' accommodation costs through the Accommodation Supplement. The maximum rate 
of the subsidy, as at May 2010, is $26.88 per day (Department of Health and Ageing, 2009b). 
The amount of the subsidy depends on the resident's assets (refer to Figure 2). The means test 
operates as follows. Take any resident currently receiving a daily Accommodation 
Supplement of $26.88. The resident continues to receive the full subsidy, provided that the 
value of her assets does not exceed $37,500. For every one thousand dollars that the value of 
her assets exceeds $37,500, the daily subsidy is reduced by $0.481. As the value of her assets 
increases, the subsidy continues to reduce until it is eliminated. The value of her assets at this 
point is $93,410.40. 
As well as providing subsidies, the Government regulates the price of residential aged 
care services. While it is not illegal for providers to set charges above the mandated levels, a 
provider’s accreditation (upon which the payment of the aforementioned subsidies is 
contingent) is dependent on its adherence to the guidelines. In practice, the regulations 




the costs of care (basic daily care fees and income-tested fees) and accommodation 
(Accommodation Bonds and Charges). 
The Government allows providers to charge a basic daily care fee, as a contribution 
to care costs and living expenses. While the level of the fee may be negotiated between 
residents and providers, it may not exceed 85% of the annual single basic aged pension.  As at 
May 2010, the maximum basic daily care fee is $38.65 (Department of Health and Ageing, 
2010). Recall that the ACFI subsidy is means-tested according to residents' incomes. The 
Government allows providers to recover any means-tested reduction in the subsidy from 
residents, so that the amount providers receive is constant, regardless of residents' incomes. 
Therefore, the maximum fee that a resident may be levied is calculated in the same way as the 
subsidy is reduced, and the amount of the income-tested fee may not exceed the reduction in 
the ACFI subsidy (refer to Figure 3). 
In addition to fees covering care costs, the Government allows providers to charge for 
the cost of residents' accommodation. The two forms of fees are an Accommodation Charge 
and an Accommodation Bond. A resident may only be asked to make an accommodation 
payment to a provider if her assets are worth more than 2.25 times the annual single basic 
pension, which, as of May 2010, is $37,500.  The type of accommodation payment levied 
depends on the type of care received by the resident. Providers may request the payment of an 
Accommodation Bond if a resident is receiving a low level of care. Residents receiving a high 
level of care may not be asked to pay an Accommodation Bond, and may instead—if their 
assets are above the aforementioned threshold—be levied an Accommodation Charge. 
The Accommodation Bond levied by firms must leave residents with at least $37,500, 
as at May 2010. The provider may ask the resident to pay any proportion of the value of her 
assets that exceed this amount. The provider may invest this sum and retain a proportion of 
the interest earned. The maximum permissible interest rate is currently 8.16% per annum. 
They may also retain an amount of the principal for a maximum period of five years. The 
maximum retention amount is set by the Government at $154.50 for bonds of no more than 
$18,540 and $299 per month for bonds of greater than $35,880 (Department of Health and 
Ageing, 2009a). Retention rates for bonds between these amounts are calculated as a linear 







to make regular payments to providers equivalent to the retention amount and interest 
payments forgone (refer to Figure 4).
5 
The Accommodation Charge may be levied by firms, in place of an Accommodation 
Bond, on residents receiving high-care services. The level of the charge may be negotiated 
between the resident and provider, though the maximum level a provider may charge is 
means-tested (refer to Figure 5). As at May 2010, a provider may not charge (per week) more 
than 1/2080 of the value of the resident's assets that exceed $37,500, up to a maximum of 
$26.88 per day for residents with assets of $93,410.40 or more (Department of Health and 
Ageing, 2010). 
In summary, the Government plays a role in all areas of the sector. The Government 
regulates the quality of services supplied by providers. If providers do not meet the specified 
standards of care provision, then they are ineligible to receive subsidies on behalf of their 
residents. The Government also limits the number of subsidised places, and these are 
allocated by geography. A range of subsidies are awarded to providers to fund capital works, 
and residents’ care and accommodation costs are subsidised. These subsidies are provided on 
the basis of residents’ care requirements and income and asset levels. The prices providers are 
permitted to charge are capped; providers’ eligibility to receive subsidies is contingent on 
their adherence to these price limits. The maximum allowable charges are means-tested on the 
basis of assets and income. These measures interact with one another to impact market 
outcomes. In combination, the interventions are complex and the net effects are impossible to 
determine precisely. In the following section we infer a range of broad consequences that 





                                                            
5 It is worth noting that we have ignored two features for the sake of simplicity. Firstly, firms are only permitted to hold a bond 
for a period of 5 years; our analysis therefore only applies to individuals with fewer than 5 years of residence. In 
Australia, as at 30 June 2008, 21% of existing residents had had a length of stay of 5 or more years (Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare, 2009). Of those who had completed their stay, only 18% had stayed for 5 or more years, while 
the average length of stay was 147.8 weeks. Secondly, a provider’s retention of a proportion of the bond principal 
reduces the return derived from the bond through interest over time. This effect is more dramatic for large bonds than 
for small ones. Given this (and in addition to the fact that the key part of our analysis in this case relates to bonds of over 
$75,000), the fact that firms might be assumed to earn some return on the retained principal, and the simplicity resulting 
from the disregard of time in our analysis, this exclusion is a reasonable one.  
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3  Embedded Incentives 
 
We now focus on the incentives embedded in the funding model described above. We have 
established that the Australian Government both provides a subsidy for residents' care and 
accommodation costs and caps the maximum price they may be charged for services. Though 
the intention of these policies may be to support residents and constrain providers, they 
provide incentives for the various agents to alter their behaviour. This could have unintended 
consequences for the functioning of the market and social welfare more broadly. 
 
3.1  The Provider’s Incentives 
 
Providers derive a number of revenue streams from the funding arrangements. Some depend 
on residents' incomes, others depend on the value of residents' assets, while others still 
depend on residents' care levels. We begin with an examination of the accommodation 
arrangements. We first characterise a typical firm’s situation when servicing low-care 
residents whom the firm is permitted to charge an Accommodation Bond. We can determine 
the total revenue the firm receives for the accommodation of a typical low-care resident; this 
consists of the bond fees paid by the resident plus the government subsidy (refer to Figure 6).  
At asset values below $136,485.77 the firm maximises revenue by accepting residents whose 
assets are valued at just over $37,500.  This is because, at this asset value, the firm is 
receiving almost the full subsidy and can charge the same retention fee as for a resident with 
$56,040 in assets. As the value of assets increases from just over $37,500, the subsidy is 
withdrawn more quickly than the bond fee increases, with the net effect negative virtually all 
the way to an asset value of $93,410.40 (revenue increases by 29 cents per day between 
$56,040 and $73,380 of assets), at which point the subsidy is exhausted. From here, as the 
asset value increases the net effect is positive since bond fees are increasing. At an asset value 
of $136,485.77 the revenue derived is roughly equivalent to that at just over $37,500 in 





Ultimately, if its goal is to maximise profit, the firm would like to attract residents 
with the highest possible asset values. This is the case provided that accommodation costs are 
homogeneous across potential residents and that any differences in care costs are fully 
subsidised. In this event, maximising revenue is equivalent to maximising profit; the firm’s 
selection of the resident from which it can extract the greatest level of revenue is a profit-
maximising decision.  
Whether a firm could secure residents with the highest possible asset values would 
depend on the level of competition, the extent to which the firm behaves in a profit-
maximising manner, and the ability of the firm to price-discriminate (which may be restricted 
by non-competitive factors). On the first condition, while it is unlikely that any provider is a 
pure monopolist, a degree of market concentration is probable, certainly on a local level. In 
Australia, aged care facilities tend to be geographically dispersed, leaving many firms as the 
sole provider of services to a local community. While it may be possible for residents to seek 
alternative accommodation in other areas, this may involve significant costs (living in an 
unfamiliar location, living a long distance from friends and family, etc.). This is likely to 
limit, at least to some extent, the level of competitive pressure on firms. On the second 
condition, while there are a number of profit-seeking aged care providers in Australia, many 
services are provided on a not-for-profit basis. However, even though many such services are 
run by registered charities, they are often operated to cross-subsidise an organisations' other 
charitable functions, like providing food and shelter to the homeless, for example.  As a 
result, it is not clear that such firms would be willing to forego additional revenue for the sake 
of alternative considerations.   
Nevertheless, there are likely to be a number of firms for whom profit maximisation 
is at most a second-order consideration. The prevalence of firms with alternative objectives in 
the residential aged care sector has implications for how one should approach it. Our analysis 
and recommendations apply only to those firms with a certain set of objectives. Firms with 
different objectives, like some not-for-profit firms, might not conform to our inferences. In 
2007-2008, only 28% of aged care services in Australia were provided by private 
organisations (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2009). The rest were provided by 
religious organisations, community-based providers, and charitable organisations. As 
mentioned, many such organisations pursue similar objectives to private, profit-seeking firms. 
However, it is likely that many do not. The existence of such firms in the industry might have  
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implications for the appropriate role of regulation or the merits of competition in producing 
optimal market outcomes. These alternative motivations are worthy of further consideration. 
The firm’s situation when providing high-care services is comparatively simple.  
Recall that a high-care resident may not be levied an Accommodation Bond, but instead may 
be levied an Accommodation Charge. This charge is means-tested, as is the Accommodation 
Supplement that the firm receives from the Government. While the net effect of the 
accommodation payment and the Accommodation Supplement was somewhat haphazard in 
the case of a low-care resident, the net effect for high-care residents is constant (refer to 
Figure 7). As asset values rise the reduction in the subsidy is exactly offset by an increase in 
the fee, yielding an amount of total revenue invariant to the value of residents' assets. As a 
result, the firm is indifferent between high-care residents with differing asset values. Thus 
there should be no incentive, on the basis of potential accommodation-related revenue, for the 
firm to discriminate between high-care residents. 
While we have established how firms might discriminate within care types, we are yet 
to determine the extent to which firms might discriminate between care types. The choice that 
firms face is simple. If costs are the same (we assume that all relevant costs are fully 
subsidised by the Government), given two residents with the same level of assets but who 
differ in terms of care requirements, from which resident can the firm extract the most 
revenue? The answer to this question depends on the value of the residents' assets (refer to 
Figure 8). The choices made by firms in practice depend on their motivations. If firms are 
motivated by profit, then their choices should align with those specified here. However, we 
know that many firms are endowed with alternative objectives. In the case of a not-for-profit 
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For a profit-maximising firm, the ultimate effects of the policy depend on the asset 
values of prospective residents (refer to Table 3). According to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2007), in 2005-2006, of couple households in Australia with the reference 
individual aged 65 or over, half had a net worth in excess of $480,000, while the average net 
worth was $868,000. Of single households in Australia, with the occupant aged 65 and over, 
half had a net worth in excess of $334,000, while the average net worth was $468,000.  Of the 
pool of potential residents, then, a considerable majority have assets that far exceed the 
$113,771.54 threshold at which low-care residents yield a greater level of revenue than high-
care residents. This could indicate a preference by providers for higher-yielding low-care 
residents over lower-yielding high-care residents. This is supported by aggregate data on the 
size of bonds collected by providers. For the 2008-2009 financial year, the average 
accommodation bond collected in Australia was estimated to be $212,958, while half of 
bond-paying residents paid a bond in excess of $200,000 (Department of Health and Ageing, 
2009c). In 13.5% of Australian homes that received new bonds, the average bond amount was 
$100,000 or less, while in 26% of Australian homes, the average bond amount was between 
$100,000 and $150,000. Without more disaggregated data, however, it is impossible to 
determine for certain in which asset band the bulk of potential aged care residents lie. This 
makes it difficult to determine providers’ true (care) preferences.  We can say, though, that a 
great many potential residents hold assets in excess of $113,771.54, and that such residents 
make up the vast bulk of the bond-payers whom firms are able to attract. 
The only remaining detail is the nature of the revenue that firms receive for the cost 
of care. Firms receive the ACFI subsidy from the Government and an income-tested fee from 
residents. The Government has structured the ACFI in such a way that the means-tested 
reduction of the subsidy is exactly offset by the means-tested increase in fees, so that the 
amount that the provider receives is constant irrespective of income (refer to Figure 9). Thus, 
provided that care costs are fully subsidised by the Government, firms will be indifferent, on 
the basis of revenue received for care costs, between residents with different incomes. 
Overall, in the absence of an insufficient subsidisation of care costs, the irregular low-care 
funding arrangements produce the only obvious source of distortion that could lead to 
discrimination between residents. 
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TABLE 3 
PROVIDERS’ CARE-TYPE PREFERENCES 
 
Asset value (AV) ($)  Preferred care type 
0 ≤ AV ≤ 37,500  Indifferent 
37.500 < AV < 75,657.69  Low-care 
AV = 75,657.69  Indifferent 
75,657.69 < AV < 113,771.54  High-care 
AV = 113,771.54  Indifferent 





3.2  The Resident’s Incentives 
 
Australians considering entering residential aged care face a number of choices. These 
choices depend, first and foremost, on an individual’s care needs. Residents requiring 
extensive care have little real choice but to opt for high-care residential services, since low-
care services are insufficient and extensive care in the home would likely be prohibitively 
expensive and, in some cases, inadequate to meet the individual’s needs. An individual with 
low-care needs, on the other hand, might consider community care to be a viable substitute 
for a low-care residential place. Indeed, the accommodation payment arrangements are likely 
to impact this choice. 
Recall that when faced with a low-care resident, a provider has an incentive to attract 
residents with the highest asset values, since the accommodation payments for low-care 
residents, at some point, increase indefinitely with asset values. Such residents—were they  
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able to attract them—could serve as ‘cash cows’ for residential aged care providers, 
potentially cross-subsidising less attractive, higher-care residents. However, faced by a 
very—and potentially boundlessly—high Accommodation Charge, residents with high asset 
values would likely seek alternative methods of care.  In the absence of other limits on the 
revenue-maximising behaviour of providers, the existence of substitute services would 
constrain the ability of firms to extract very large accommodation payments. Consumers with 
very high asset values might find better value in hiring a carer to assist at home, for example.   
Despite being in demand by providers since, unlike high-care residents, their 
accommodation payments are uncapped, low-care residents (unlike high-care residents) have 
the luxury of choice. The key question becomes: at the bond values at which low-care 
residents are more attractive to providers than high-care residents, are alternative methods of 
care viable substitutes? At moderate asset levels, it is unlikely that residents face considerably 
less expensive equivalent alternatives. At the $113,771.54 asset level (at which the provider 
would be indifferent between a low- and high-care resident), a provider may ask a low-care 
resident to pay a maximum bond equivalent to a weekly charge of $188.16. Given the 
modesty of this charge, such individuals might be inclined to accept it. As asset values rise, 
however, the maximum charge becomes less reasonable and, as a result, alternatives would 
likely become more appealing. At the median wealth level for Australian singles aged over 65 
($334,000), for example, a provider may levy the equivalent of a weekly charge of $532.89, 
while at the average wealth level for such individuals ($468,000), the equivalent weekly 
charge is $742.50. For residents with assets worth $1,000,000, a provider is permitted to levy 
the equivalent of a weekly charge of $1,575.05. This is sure to be unacceptably high for the 
typical low-care resident with such an asset level. There are likely to be many far less 
expensive alternatives available (hiring a full-time carer and all of the relevant support 
equipment, for one). It is difficult, though, to determine the typical asset value at which the 
alternatives become viable substitutes.  
In practice, there appears to have been a switching of individuals from low- 
residential aged care to (in-home) community care. There have been a number of anecdotal 
reports of a ‘hollowing-out’ of the lowest of low care services in Australia (Parliament of 
Australia, 2009), while there has been a considerable decline in the proportion of Australian 
aged care residents receiving a low level of care (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2009). At the same time there has been a boom in the take-up of community care. There have 
been widespread reports of aged care facilities facing difficulty in sourcing higher-yielding 
low-care residents (Parliament of Australia, 2009). At the same time, these firms have been 
reluctant to take on high-care residents, as they do not consider them to be an attractive 
source of funds (recall that they may not be levied an Accommodation Bond). The resultant 
gap is reported to have placed a great deal of pressure on providers across the industry, 
prompting calls for high-care residents to be charged in a similar way to low-care residents 
(Parliament of Australia, 2009). 
Regarding high-care services, recall that firms are indifferent between residents on 
the basis of assets. Unlike the potentially limitless Accommodation Bonds that may be 
extracted from low-care residents, the Accommodation Charge levied on high-care residents 
is capped. This distinction between care types is likely a response to the lack of choice faced 
by high-care residents. The view seems to be that, since high-care residents are considered 
unfortunate and particularly in need (and thus potentially vulnerable), it would be 
inappropriate for providers to be able to extract an unlimited amount of revenue from them. 
As a result, the choice faced by the typical high-care resident is simple; her only real option is 
to seek a high-care place in a residential aged care facility, and the price she pays for her 
accommodation rises with the value of her assets to a modest, capped level.  
Recall, though, that firms have an incentive to discriminate between care types at 
different asset levels. At some income levels, in the case of a constrained supply of places, 
high-care residents may be unable to secure a place. The last resort for such an individual is a 
hospital bed. The occupation of public hospital beds by aged care residents with no 
alternative is a major point of friction in the Australian public hospital system (National 
Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009). In 2006 around 2400 Australians eligible  
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and approved to receive residential aged care services and not requiring hospital care 
occupied a hospital bed (Australian Government, 2010). Of these individuals, 63% had been 
waiting in hospital for more than 35 days. Addressing this problem has been identified as a 
key part of the health reform agenda in Australia. 
 
3.3  Cost-shifting and accountability across different levels of government 
 
So when an individual is unable to locate a high-care residential place, she has little choice 
but to occupy a public hospital bed. Unlike low-care residents, many of who have the option 
of either community (in-home) care or low- residential care, high-care residents have special 
needs that limit the feasibility of alternatives. The substitutability of hospital beds for high-
care residential places gives rise to two important connections. The first, which we address 
later, is between aged care and the broader health care system. The second, which we deal 
with here, is between the Australian Government (which regulates and provides funding for 
all residential aged care services) and the various state and territory governments (which have 
primary responsibility for the funding of public hospitals).  
When a high-care individual occupies a public hospital bed, rather than the high-care 
residential place for which she is eligible, the cost of her care is borne by the responsible state 
or territory government. As a consequence, until such time as the individual is able to locate 
and occupy a high-care residential place, the Australian Government avoids paying the 
subsidies that would normally apply to her. Thus, in the event of a shortage of high-care 
places, a proportion of the Australian Government’s health care cost burden is shifted onto 
states’ and territories’ budgets.
6 This suggests that it has an incentive to restrict the 
availability of high-care places, since doing so would benefit its fiscal position at the cost of 
the states’ and territories’. This practice, known as ‘cost-shifting’, has been identified as an 
important area for reform.  
In practice, the Australian Government’s propensity to cost-shift is difficult to determine. 
Budgetary considerations are certain to play some role in determining the number of allocated 
places. The level of cost-shifting depends on whether nursing homes provide a sufficient 
number of high-care places. This is a function of both the number of places allocated by the 
Government and the willingness of firms to offer places to high-care residents. The latter 
depends on the adequacy of the funding derived from high-care residents, and was addressed 
earlier. We address the former now. 
Each year the Government specifies the number of subsidised low- and high-care places 
allocated by region. Assuming providers take up all of the allocated places, the occupancy 
level is an indicator of the sufficiency of the allocation. In the 2008-2009 financial year, the 
average occupancy rate across all bed types in Australia was 92.9% (Department of Health 
and Ageing, 2009c). As at 30 June 2009, there were 49.9 low-care places and 49.3 high-care 
places allocated per 1000 people in the Australian population aged 70 or older (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2009). Of the allocated low-care places, 44.2 (or 88.6%) were 
operational, while this figure stood at 42.6 (or 86.4%) for high-care places. While the 
allocation of places seems fairly tight overall, the relative slackness of the high-care 
allocation casts doubt over the likelihood that the Government restricts the supply of high-
care places in a bid to cost-shift. It still remains likely, however, that firms’ unwillingness to 
service high-care residents forces individuals to enter the hospital system, shifting costs from 
the Australian Government’s budget to those of the states and territories. Thus the legislated 
inability of providers to levy high-care residents an Accommodation Bond could benefit the 
Australian Government’s fiscal position.  
                                                            
6 Since a resident’s occupation of a hospital bed allows her to avoid the fees (for both accommodation and care costs) that would 
apply were she to reside in a nursing home, individuals benefit financially from this scenario. However, since the 
occupation of a hospital bed may impose additional (non-financial) costs on the individual, it is impossible to determine 
whether the typical individual would prefer a hospital bed to a residential aged care place. Regardless, since the 
resident’s placement is out of her control, the effect on her incentives of the substitutability of hospital beds for high-
care residential places is irrelevant to this analysis.  
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In April 2010, the Australian Government announced a range of measures intended to 
eliminate cost-shifting between itself and the states and territories (Australian Government, 
2010). The Australian Government is to provide an additional $300 million over 4 years to 
support investment in an additional 2500 residential aged care places. Since the 
underprovision of residential high-care services is likely due to high-care residents’ relatively 
lower financial value to providers, it is difficult to see how an additional allocation of places 
will do much to address the incidence of cost-shifting. A more direct response is the 
Australian Government’s plan to provide $280 million over 4 years to the states and 
territories to fund the hospital costs of individuals awaiting a high-care residential place. This 
directly reverses the cost-shift, placing the burden back onto the Australian Government’s 
budget. However, this does not address the underlying incentives responsible for the problem. 
The incentive for providers to discriminate against high-care residents appears to be 
responsible for the occupation of hospital beds by aged care residents, and thereby the shift of 
costs from the Australian Government to the states and territories. Any attempt to correct the 
problem must focus on correcting these incentives.  
 
4  Lessons for Reform  
 
Our analysis of the Australian residential aged care sector provides a number of important 
lessons for reform. Any change to the current arrangements should be considered in light of 
these lessons. The aged care system is fragmented, with care provided via a number of 
channels—community (in-home) care, residential low-care, residential high-care, and hospital 
care—depending on the needs of the individual. If the channels were fully independent, it 
might be appropriate to manage them individually. However, as we have shown, there are a 
number of ‘marginal’ individuals who could enter a number of different channels. Many 
individuals face a choice between community care and low-care residential services, for 
example, while others who would like to occupy a high-care residential place are forced to 
occupy a hospital bed instead. As a result, the funding arrangements of any one of the 
channels affect demand not only for that channel, but also for the other channels. Indeed, this 
is precisely what we have shown. Reforms of the policy framework must consider the 
interactions between channels, and the incentives must be geared accordingly. 
Furthermore, while three of the channels are (largely) confined to the aged care system, 
one resides within the mainstream health care system. As we have shown, aged care residents 
can move between nursing homes and public hospitals depending on the number of high-care 
residential places available. Given this, policymakers should not consider aged care in 
isolation, but rather in the context of the broader health care system. To date, the various 
interactions have not received enough of policymakers’ attention, despite their contribution to 
much of the dysfunction that currently occurs. Piecemeal approaches have done little to 
address the problems plaguing the industry; policymakers ought to take a bigger-picture view. 
We will provide more on this in a moment. 
One of the key messages to emerge from our analysis is the importance of incentives. 
Reform approaches to date have mostly centred on the practical aspects of health care 
provision, and rightly so; they are clearly an important piece of the puzzle. It is disappointing, 
however, that the incentives underlying the health care system have not been devoted the 
attention they deserve. Since incentives are the most common source of unintended policy 
consequences, policymakers would do well to attend to them. Indeed, in the case of aged care, 
the perverse incentives embedded in the current policy framework are the source of some of 
the greatest threats to the sector. By addressing providers’ preferences for low-care residents 
over high-care residents, much of the pressure facing the sector would be alleviated. The 
inability to derive an equivalent level of funding from high-care residents as low-care 
residents is placing pressure on providers’ finances. The resultant restriction of the supply of 
high-care residential places is making it difficult for individuals to access suitable 
accommodation, forcing them into public hospital beds. The occupation of public hospital 
beds by those eligible for a residential aged care place is a major source of pressure on the 
public hospital system today. While the correction of these incentives is no panacea, it should  
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play a role in the overall health reform agenda. Plainly, these kinds of perverse incentives are 
not unique to the Australian situation. Our analysis provides yet more evidence that incentives 
matter and should be at the forefront of policymakers’ minds. 
As is often the case in public policy, the road to perverse incentives is paved with good 
intentions. While the Australian Government is attempting to assist high-care residents by 
exempting them from being charged an Accommodation Bond, doing so restricts their access 
to traditional services, thereby forcing them into public hospital beds. A by-product of this is 
that the costs of these individuals’ care are shifted from the Australian Government’s budget 
to those of the states and territories. This makes correcting the current arrangements costly for 
the Australian Government. But the emergence of a properly-functioning aged care sector 
relies on getting the underlying incentives right. The Band-Aid approaches taken in the past, 
which have focused merely on additional funding without altering the underlying incentives, 
have been inadequate. The challenges facing the sector will only worsen in the decades ahead, 
heightening the need for reform that delves deeper into the system’s underpinnings. 
The lessons we’ve presented reach past the boundaries of the aged care sector and 
make a broader comment about the wider Australian health reform agenda. The various fields 
of health care share a range of common features, rooting them in a common context. 
Problems in one field may have an impact on another and lessons from one field may prove 
instructive for another. In aged care we have called for an holistic approach to reform and the 
elevation of incentives within the attention span of policymakers. But these calls apply just as 
well to the entire health care system. The time has come to embark upon a major 
microeconomic reform program in which aged care reform represents just one of many 
reform dimensions. This is no small task, but it is the surest way to produce an optimally-
functioning health care system that has the health and wellbeing of all as its cornerstone. 
While such an agenda might seem audacious, a reform program of a similar scale has 
been completed before in Australia. And it has been remarkably successful. The National 
Competition Policy reforms of the 1990s are proof that a bold and extensive reform agenda, if 
implemented appropriately, can have a positive effect on the functioning of key markets. At 
their core, these reforms focused on incentives. They redefined the role of public and private 
participants in the provision of services. Importantly, they lead to new and innovative mixes 
of competition and regulation to underpin well-functioning markets.  
The reforms to the Australian energy sector serve as a useful illustration. One of the 
central measures was the unbundling of the chain of production, distribution and retail in 
electricity and gas, which mitigated or eliminated a raft of adverse firm behaviours. The 
reforms also included privatisations in some states and corporatisations of government-owned 
enterprises in others. The mix of competition and regulation changed dramatically in the new 
energy market framework. Competitive wholesale markets were introduced, since the 
generation of electricity and production of gas could be optimally provided in competitive 
markets. For natural monopoly activities newly established regulators set prices. Retail prices 
were initially set by governments in some jurisdictions and regulators in others, but 
eventually retail competition was introduced. 
Importantly, the markets’ ailments were not cured overnight. While the reform process 
was well conceived in advance, the implementation of a successful set of arrangements took a 
decade or more to achieve. To this day, the various policies continue to be fine-tuned in 
response to an improved understanding of behaviour, changing market conditions, and market 
experience. The institutions that arose from the reforms took years to establish and integrate 
into the market landscape. The reforms were a long and costly process, but the benefits have 
been considerable. The problems faced by the Australian health care sector, like those 
described earlier in the context of aged care, call for this kind of serious reform. Band-Aids 
will not be enough. A well-conceived program of microeconomic reform in health care will 
take time to develop and implement, but the benefits are likely to be substantial. 
  
  16 
REFERENCES 
 
Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency (2010) “About us”, 
http://www.accreditation.org.au/about-us/. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006) Population projections, Australia, 2004 to 2101, 
Statistics publication 3222.0 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics). 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007) Household wealth and wealth distribution, Australia, 
2005-06, Statistics publication 6554.0 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics). 
 
Australian Government (2010) A national health and hospitals network: further investments 
in Australia’s health. (Canberra: Australian Government). 
 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2009) Residential aged care in Australia 2007-08: 
a statistical overview, Aged Care Statistics Series 28 (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare). 
 




Department of Health and Ageing (2009b) “Aged care subsidies and supplements; New 




Department of Health and Ageing (2009c) Report on the Operation of the Aged Care Act 
1997: 1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia). 
 





National Health and Hospital Reform Commission (2009) A healthier future for all 
Australians, Final Report, June 2009 (Canberra: National Health and Hospitals Reform 
Commission). 
 
Parliament of Australia (2009) “Inquiry into residential and community aged care in 
Australia”, http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/fapa_ctte/aged_care/. 
 
 
 